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IMPACT OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN CHURCHES UPON 
THEIR OWN SOCIETIES 
by Paul Mo j ze s  
Pau l Mo jzes ( Uni t e d  Metho d i s t) i s  a na t ive 
of Yug o s lav ia . After comp let ing two years at 
Be l grade Unive r s i t y  Law Scho o l , he immi­
gra ted to the Unit e d  S t a t e s  of America where 
he comp l e t e d  his  educat ion , rece iving a B . A .  
degree f rom Florida S outhe rn Co l lege and a 
Ph . D .  from Bo s t on Unive r s i t y .  He i s  
Pro f e s s or of  Religious S tudies at Ro s emont 
Co l lege and Manag ing Edi t or of the Journa l 
o f  Ecumenic a l  Studie s . His  book 
Chr i s t ian-Marxi s t  Dialogue in East ern Europe 
(Minneap o l is : Aug sburg Pub l i sh ing House , 
1 981)  is  one o f  the many pub l i cations on the 
t op ic of  relig ion in Ea s t e rn Europe . This  
re search paper was wr i t t en for  the 
Wa shingt on In s t i tute for Va lues in Pub lic 
Po l icy and is use d  here with their 
pe rmis s ion .  The paper was de l ivered at a 
conference in Washingt on , D . C .  on October 
1 6 ,  1 9 8 2 . 
Had Marxist  foreca s t s wh ich were made at the t ime of  the Communist 
revo lut ions or take-ove rs in regard to t he impact of  the churche s or 
re l i gion be en on targe t , one could have s ta t e d  that the impac t  of  the 
churches  on society in t he 1 980s would be ni ll or so neg ligib l e  that a 
paper wou ld no t ne e d  to be wr it t e n .  But they were wrong about the 
"withering away of religion " , to borrow a Marx ian phra se . And so  
likewise wro ng were tho s e  opponent s  of  Marxi sm who glo omily made the 
same pre dict ions when they witnes sed t he mass ive Commun i s t  ons laught 
upon the churche s which caused much suf fering and de s t ruc t ion . The 
re al ity of t he Ea s t e rn European r e l igious s ituat i on is very d i fferent 
f rom what mo s t  peop le could have expec t e d  and i t  i s  much more nuanced 
and variable t han mo s t  c asual observe rs and l e s s  c are ful student s  o f  the 
scene are capable of di scerning . 
Due to different h i s t orical  c ircumstance s ,  tradi t i ons , church 
po l i t ies and po l i t i c s ,  Communist  party strengths or weakne s s e s  in 
ap p l i cation of Marxist precep t s  to rel igion and soc iety , there is today 
an almo st bewi ldering variety of ways in wh ich the impact of  t he church 
is  be ing fel t in the S oviet  Union , Po land , Eas t Germany , Czecho s lovakia 
Hungary , Roman ia , Yugos lavia , Bulgaria , and Alban ia . 
The Communi s t  revo lut i on or t ake-over brought the greatest  
chal l enge to organi zed religion s ince Chr i s t ianity became legal ly 
recogni zed under Const ant ine the Grea t  ear ly in the fourth century . 
The re we re other great upheava ls  s ince that t ime , s t a r t ing with the 
br i e f  re storat i on of "pagan i sm" under Ju l ian , a cou s in of Cons tant ine 
1 the Great , emperor from 3 6 1 -363 . Among them one shou l d  ment i on the 
gre at and oft en vio lent riva lry b etween Chr i s t ians and Jews , between 
Eastern · Orthodox and Roman Ca tho l ic s , and lat er in the 1 6 th century 
b etwe en Ca tho l ics and Pro t e s t ants , and t he Mongol and Turki sh Mus l im 
domina tions which cau s e d  incalculab le uphe ava l s  in the Chr i s t ian 
communit ies of Russ ia and t he Balkans . But prior to t he t ime of  the 
Bo l shevik revo lut ion in 1 9 1 7  and the immediate  p o s t  Wor l d  War II period 
when t he re s t  of E a s t e rn Europe became soc ial i s t , the religious 
in s t itutions , p a rt i cularly the large e s t a b l i shed churche s ,  ha d a 
p r ivilege s t atus in t he community and f re quent ly exerc i s e d  a dominant 
ro le in socie t y . Among Chr i s t ians this pattern is ca l le d  the 
Con s ta ntinian model of chu rch-state re l a t ions in wh ich t he p rivi leged 
church support s the social arrangement which guarantees it a favored 
t re atment . 
I t  is easy to ove r s imp l i fy the Const antinian model and pre sent a 
s it ua t i on whe re a par t ic ular church exert s  such an inf luence that it 
factua l ly runs the society and seeks for i t s e l f  a monopo ly s i t uation at 
the expense of oth er po ten t i a l ly r ival religions . I t  is  already 
di sce rnib le in this ove r s imp l i f ie d  patt ern that not a l l  churche s and 
religious in s t itut ions found themse lves in the favored ,  Cons tant inian 
pa t t ern . Jews , for instance , never got into such a favored s it ua t ion and 
we re l ucky to f ind o cca s io nal ly various degrees of tole rance . The s ame 
was true of the Prot e s t ant "sectarians " ,  i . e .  the so ca l le d  "Free 
Churches"  ( e . g . Bap t is t s ,  Me thodi s t s , Mennonites , Penteco s t a ls , 
Advent i s t s ) who some t imes exper ienced severe rep re s s ion a t  the hands of  
t he e s t abli she d  state  churches . The pa t t e rn it s e l f  is not  ful ly reliab le 
because it is obvious that during cert ain. his torical periods the state 
exerc i sed a par amount inf luence over t he church , as for instance at the 
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t i me of  Pet er the Grea t  and his  succe s sors  in Rus s i a , who sought to 
re duce t he Rus s ian Orthodox Church to  a convenient department of  s tate 
and s t r ic t ly cont ro l le d  church activi t ie s . Without succumb ing t o  the 
t emp t a t i on to prov ide a nuanced and de t a i led p ic ture , it  sha l l  suffice 
to  say that many re l igious in s t i t u t ions enjoyed a s t a tus that granted 
them a gre at deal of powe r ,  inf luence , and pres t ige in society . In fact , 
the re l a t ionship be tween church and society  tended t o  be so  c l o s e  that 
in many p l aces the re was a ne arly t o t a l  iden t i f ic a t i on of e thnic i ty with 
re l igious a f f i l i a t ion . Thus Bulgar ians , Romanians , Serb ians , 
Mace don ians , Montenegr ins , Rus s ians , and at t imes Ukrainians and White 
Rus s ians were aut oma t ica l ly by b irth Ortho dox . Croat ians , S lovenes , 
P o l e s , and for a l l  prac t ical purpos e s  t he majority of  t he Hungarians , 
C zechs , and S l ovaks were Roman Catho l ic ,  whi l e  East  Germans were 
Pro t e s t ants . On ly in Hungary and among t he Czechs and S lovaks were t here 
al s o  Pro t e s t ant s and some Orthodox who were not a l ienated  from their 
e thnic ity by bel onging to  a different r e l igious t ra d i t i on . Among 
Albanians there were Ortho dox ,  Catho l ic and Mus l ims . It is  hard for a 
pe rson n ot f rom t he reg i on to  apprec i a te this extreme ly close 
iden t i f ic a t i on of  church with the nat i on ;  an ident i f icat ion which to 
this  day p lays a very s ign i f icant role and accoun t s  for a s igni ficant 
part of  the impact that many churches s t i l l  cont inue to have . As one of  
t he ce ntral pe rsi s tent factors of r e l igious inf luence in Eas t e rn Europe 
it mus t  no t be neglected  in any ana ly s i s . 
When t he Commun i s t s  came into power t hey general ly a t t empt e d  t o  
imp l ement a Lenin i s t  formula , on ly p a r t i a l ly insp ired by Marx , of  
lega l ly s eparat ing t he s t a t e  and t he schoo l s  f rom re l igion ( the American 
model of separa t i on of church and s t at e  had l i t t l e  inf l uence in Eastern 
Europe p r i or to  t he Communi s t  rule ) ,  al lowing l imited l egal existence t o  
ne arly a l l  re l igious commun i t ie s . From the perspect ive of  t h e  Commun i s t  
Party , religion w a s  a rea c t ionary re f l e c tion of  former c l a s s  socie t ie s  
which s t ands i n  t h e  way of  progre s s  and mus t  b e  comb a t e d  by a l l  
ava i l ab le means , subject on ly to  avo iding t he b oome rang e f f ec t  which 
cau s e s  further fanat ic i zat ion of re l igious per sons . Since the Communi s t  
pa rt y  exerc i s e s  in Marxi s t  par lance , " t he leading role"  in t he s tate , 
the s e  two theore t ic a l l y  d i f f erent approaches  coalesced  in real i t y  into a 
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single pract ice of ma s s ive state  int ervention in rel igious mat t ers 
seeking to res t r i ct and u l t imat e ly abo l i sh ins t itut ion a l  r e l igion . The 
imp lementation of the overarching po l ic i e s  o s c i l lated depending on the 
re s i l ie ncy of t he religious commun i t ies and t he needs of t he s ta t e . For 
ins t ance , Sta l in needed the support ·of  the Rus s i an Ortho dox Church 
during the Na zi  o f f ensive , so he relaxed some pres sures and gave 
permiss ion for the part ia l rebuil ding of the ecc l e s ia s t ic a l  hierarchy . 
Or, t he churches aid might be s ought in imp lementa t ion of certain 
agr icultura l p o l icies  to induce the populat ion t o  work harder . The 
Communi s t  Pa rty tac i t ly concedes that t he Church has inf luence among 
certain group s of  the popu lat ion where the party ' s  inf l uence i s  sma l l .  
This  i s  done in exchange for certain priv i l eges t o  the Church . 
New Mode l s  for the Churches  
I t  is under stood by both the Party and the churches that  the 
ult imate aim of �he Communi st  Party is a soc iety in which no organi zed 
re l igion wil l exi s t  o r  exert any inf l uence . Here no Eastern European 
Commun i st Pa rty has seen f i t  to adopt t he mo d i f icat ions int roduced by 
the I t a l ian Communi s t  Party giving ful le r  recognit i on t o  the p rogre s s ive 
impact of religi ous groups . This  ra dical ly new p osit i on o f  t he church 
ha s been described by Bohdan Cywin s ki who co ine d the phra s e  "the Jul ian 
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Church" as he attemp t s  to describe the r o l e  of  the church in the fu l ly 
etat ized , secu larized society . Cywinski wro t e ,  
The Jul ian i s  exact ly t he o ppo s ite t o  t he 
Con s t antinian s ituat ion . Ins t ead of  cooper­
a t ing , t he secular and ecc l e s ia s t ic 
aut horit i e s  are in conf l ic t . The Church i s  
put in a pos it i on in wh ich she has no opt i on 
but to be in oppos i t i o n .  She is  devo i d  o f  
po l i t ic a l  power but is  recognized b y  society 
as it s pr incipal mor a l  authority . Thi s  
p rov ides h e r  w i t h  a new s ource of  s t r ength • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ihe Ju l ian is not a church wh ich on i t s  own 
vo l i t i on gave up the part ic ip a t i on in powe r .  
To t he contrary , she i s  r anc o rous and b i t t e r  
:ha§ s h e  w a s  exc luded from part ic ipat ion i n  
�t . 
Thi s Ju l ian ro le is , as de scribed by Cywinski , mo s t  dis t inct ly 
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ap p l icable to the Roman Catho lic Church in Poland , which among the 
Ea s t e rn Europe an chu rches has t he gre a t e s t  degree of popu lar support in 
it s own count ry . It app l i es to many other countries  to a l e s s e r  degree .  
O ther E a s t e rn European thinke rs , who likew i se dwe l led on the 
obvi ous , i . e .  the disappearance of  the Cons t ant inian mode l ,  have 
p romo ted other models for t he churches . The t heo logians of t he Church o f  
t h e  Czech Bre thre n ,  taking their lead from Joseph Hromadka , their  
l ea d ing theo log ian , s a id t he church shou ld wel come t he new s o c ia l i s t  
or der and become a "pi lgrim church" rep re sent ing t h e  ro le o f  the 
cru c i f ie d  Chri s t , e schew ing p o l i t ic a l  power but s eeking to trans form and 
he lp tho s e  who are radic a l  trans formers of exp l o i t ive and unjus t  clas s 
s o c ie t ies . 
The Hungarian Pro t e stants co ine d the phr ase " the se rvant church" 
and " theo logy of service " wh ich is c ons onant w i th t he model of the 
Church of the Czech Bre thren , s t res s ing s e rvice to socie t y . Many of  
their theo log ians s ee t he demo l it ion of  t he Con s tant inian mode l a 
d i s t inct b l e s s ing for the churc h ,  an opportun i t y  to  get back t o  the rea l  
t ask of t he chu rch , name ly n o t  t o  r u l e  b u t  to  serve . The early apo s t o l ic 
church is deeme d worth emulat ing . 
The Eas t e rn Ortho dox Churche s ,  deep ly s t eeped in l i l turgical 
( sa c rament a l )  t ra d i t ion , have embraced ne ither of these mode l s . The ir 
ma in conce rn is t o  cont inue t o  offer  the salv i f ic mysterie s to  the i r  
p eo p le w i th t he c onv ict ion that G o d  s ha l l  not a l low t he church t o  
perish . Empires  come and empires  go , some friendly , some antagon i s t ic , 
b ut t he Chu rch of Chri s t  wi l l  last  e t e rnal ly . Their  p o l icy o f  
acquie scence bothers many a We s t e rn act iv i s t  b u t  it  s t ems from long 
experience that surviv a l  demands· f lexibi l it y ,  s i lence in t he p o l i t ical 
aren a ,  and a dogge d det erminat ion to  provide worship opportun i t i e s  and 
p re serve t he c anonic al  s tructures of t he Church . 
S t i l l  another mo del is be ing embraced by many " sect arians " ,  tho s e  
bel ong ing to  t he sma l l  religious communi t ies . Domina ted b y  an 
ap ocalyp t ic the o logy , their percep t ion is that this  wor l d  is quickly 
approaching i t s  end and t he power of evi l  is making i t s  l a s t  c onvu l s ive 
e ffor t s  to dominate  th is  wor l d .  S oon , howeve r ,  it wi l l  be crushed 
forever by Go d ' s g l o ri ous v ic t ory in wh ich all t he f a i thful w i l l  be 
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saved et erna l ly , whi le tho s e  oppo s ing God ' s  re ign wi l l  be damned . Their 
emphasis  is on per sonal s a lva t i on with l it t l e  or no interest  in making 
pub l ic impact . Yet they of ten ga in adhe rent s ,  mo s t ly from among the 
marginal segments of soc iety , as is evident among Evange lical  Bap t i s t s  
in the Soviet Union and Romania , becau s e  their theol ogy p re s en t s  a sharp 
ideo logical alt ernative to t he official  Marx i s t  teaching which leaves 
many peop le unt ouche d .  
The At t i tude s o f  Churche s Toward Socia l i sm 
The que st ion o f  the model o f  the church activity i s  of  int rin s ic 
int ere st  but i t s  impor tance is heightened by t he fact that t he Communist 
Par t i es made an effort to e l iminat e  a l l  other p o l i t ical , soc i a l , 
int e l lectual , economic , and even sports organi zat ions which had any 
independence from the Communi s t  Par ty . The churche s rema ined de facto 
the on ly major in s t itut ion wh ich esp oused an ideo logy o ther than 
Marxism . It wa s soon perc e ived by the Commun i s t s  that the churche s might 
be used as an ins trument of re s i s tance aga in st  i t s  mode of o rgani z ing 
society . The same ins ight occured to tho s e  who want e d  to show their 
disapproval of the e s t ab l ished orde r ;  they wou ld some t ime s support the 
churche s no t for rel igious reasons  but because they wanted to exp re s s  an 
unfavor able a t t itude toward t he gove rnment . When one adds to this  the 
unden iable fact that there were very few Communi s t  sympathi zers among 
the act ive church- leade rs it becomes evident that the churches were f rom 
the out s e t  counted among tho s e  who wou l d  opp o s e  Communi s t  p o l ic ie s . This 
po sture can be labeled " re l igion against  s oc i a l i sm" or even 
ant i-soc i a l i s t  re l igion . 
That  "re l igion aga ins t soc i a l i sm" i s  s t i l l  the p reva l en t  form of 
church a t t itude needs no do cument ation .  The f i r s t  years of  Communist  
takeove r were characterized by a some t ime s b i t t e r  and violent 
confront a t i on� The s tate re sorted to rep re s s ive me asures caus ing 
ma rtyrdom and great deva s t at ion ins t it ut iona l ly and individua l ly .  
The Marx i s t s  judged the impact  of rel igion upon social  p o l ic ies as 
a l t oge ther negat ive . For them the only que s t ion was wha t  was the most 
e ffect ive way of c onf ront ing the churches . Tac t ical  app roaches  d iffere d .  
In some ins t ance s  the major church in a country wa s at t acked so 
me rc i le s s ly that t he sma l ler churches got the me s sage that res i s t ance 
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was f ru it le ss and t hey we re cowed into s i lence . Thi s  was t he c a se with 
the Catho l ic Church in Hungary and Czecho s lovakia where the mo s t  b i t ter 
re s is t ance aga in st t he new socia l i s t  society  came f rom Roman Catho l ics . 
In ot her in st ance s  the po l icy was t o  make an examp l e  o f  a sma l l er church 
to show how ruth le s s  t he a t t ack can be , thus provi ding a l e s s on to the 
la rger church to avo id conf ront a t ion . That was the . case  of Bulgaria 
whe re the s ta te t arge ted its a t t ack on t he four sma l l  Pro t e s tant 
churche s and succeeded in int imidat ing the Bul gar ian Orthodox Church . 
The s ec ond pos s ib le p o s t ure i s  "re ligion indifferent to  soc i a l i sm. " 
Acc ording to  this approach the l i f e  o f  the churche s goe s  on wit hout 
e i ther showing a c t i ve re s i s t ance or embrac ing t he new soc ial order . This  
is  usua l ly a form of  accomodat ion which considers  all  socia l orders  as 
t emp orary in nature , whi l e  t he church has an ab iding sense of  mi s s ion 
and wi l l  survive t h i s  social  order as i t  ha s ,  for ins t ance the Roman or 
Byz an t ine Emp i re , t he Turk i sh rule , and so fort h .  Many Eas t e rn Ort hodox 
Churche s have as sume d this p o s t ure of tacit  acqu iescence coup le d  with 
t he hope of  divine del ive rance . The church avo ids any exp l ic i t ly 
po l it ical  pos ture , ne i t her direc t ly a i ding nor res i s t ing socia l i sm .  At 
be s t  some church l eaders wi l l  declare f rom t ime to  time that certain 
so cia l i s t  p o l ic i e s  are  no t in imic a l  to church te achings or that t hey may 
be in accord w i th a l ong he l d  church p o s i t i on ,  e . g .  on curb ing persona l 
gre e d  or t rying to  bring peace . The l a t t er i s s ue , i . e .  working for 
p eace , is  by f ar t he mo s t  mutual ly accept able social  i s sue on which a 
po l i t ical ly non-invo lved church and the s t a t e  can f ind a common 
p l at form. In mo s t  s o c ia l i s t  socie t i e s  t he churches have been encouraged 
by the government to work for peace as it wa s hop e d  that by carefu l  
inf luence t he church ' s  pos i t i on could b e  channe l l ed t o  b e  ino f f ens ive o r  
i n  tune w i t h  t he government ' s  fore ign p o l icy . 
The third form of accommoda t i on may be c a l led " re l igion in 
so cia l i sm , " or  re l igion within soc i a l i sm .  Thi s  part icula r  phrase  was 
c o ine d by t he l eaders of t he Evange l i c a l  ( Lu the ran ) Churches  in East 
Germany a s  they s truggled to  f ind a theo l ogic a l ly and socially 
pro duc t ive re lat ion ship to  soc ial ism.  They reject e d  t he f ormer two 
mod e l s  as they f e l t  that it led  to a ment a l i t y  of be ing an al ien in 
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on e ' s  own land . Indee d ,  many East  Germans were in a spir itual 
emi gra t i on ,  looking forward to  German reun i on which wou ld free t hem from 
the Soviet-type socia l is t  impo s it ion . Others in East  Germany 
aggre s s ive ly urge d a much more intimate endorsement of soc i a l i sm ,  a 
"re l igion for soc i a l i sm , "  which is  t o  be descr ibe d below .  With the 
phra se "the church within social i sm" it  was hoped to  communic a t e  the 
ac cept ance of the fact that the social sys t em for the for s e ab l e  future 
was a social i st one and that w ishful t h inking would not change it . Thus 
the church accept s this as i t s  mi s s i on ,  name ly to work in this 
par t ic ular soc i a l i s t  societ y  wit hout nurtur ing i l lus ions about e s c ape to  
the Wes t  or  some magic disappearance o f  soc i a l ism .  Wi thin this  social 
sy s t em t he church has a task of  humaniz ing i t  and interact ing with it  in 
wha tever manner po s s ib l e . With this approach it is p o s s ib l e  for the 
Chu rch in East  Ge rmany to  cont inue a number of their s o c i a l  and 
chari t able inst itut ions ( e . g .  ho sp it a l s ,  o l d  peop l e ' s  home s , youth 
f e l lowships ) and occas ional ly t he churches do speak out against  certain 
social po licies ( e . g .  universal  mi l i t ary conscript i on or p re-mi l i t ary 
e duca t i on in t he schoo l s ) .  
"Rel igion for socia l i sm" is  a mino r i t y  approach among churches in 
E a s t e rn Europe but it has i t s  adheren t s . Their mot ivat i on and act ions 
va ry cons iderab ly . Some are simply opportun i s t s  or careeri s t s . But 
o t he rs a re theo logic a l ly or soc ial ly sens i t ive p eople who were shocked 
by the church ' s  re act i onary po l icies  of  the p a s t  when the church may 
have been an ac comp l i ce of  p ro-Naz i  polic ies , or s ided w i th t he 
pr ivi lege d c l a s se s , giving no heed t o  the poor and downtr odden . In their 
op ini on t he pa st behavi or of  t he churches requires total repentance on 
pa rt  of the churche s .  Socia l i sm is s e en either as an instrument of  
pun ishment by God , or mo re f re quent ly as God working out s ide t he realm 
of  the churche s ,  even by means of  a h o s t i l e  athe i s t ic social  syst em ,  to 
b r ing about gr eater social jus t ice and harmony than t he p revious 
societ y .  Many prot agoni s t s  of this view of "re l igion for s o c ia l i sm" 
perce ive t he world to be shaped through t he s truggle of two social 
s y s t ems--cap i t a l ism,  which they see on i t s  way out , and socia l i sm ,  which 
t hey b e l ieve to be the wave of t he future . The re is no third way , t hey 
say . Thus one mus t  dec ide for socia l i sm (East  Germans cal l  it 
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"par t i s an s h ip ")  because soc i a l i sm means p rogre s s , peace , jus t ice , 
e qua l it y ,  digni t y ,  etc . Acco r ding to  thi s vi e w ,  s i t t ing on the fence 
is as ba d as be ing for cap i t a l ism.  The f i r s t  to vigorous ly e sp ouse such 
views in East  Europe was the famous and cont rove r s i a l  Czech theo l ogian , 
Jo s eph Hromadka , who swaye d many young t heo log ians in h i s  church (The 
Czech Bre t hren ) arid out s i de to  fo l low him on this path of  bo l d  
ac cept ance of so c i a l i sm w i th t he a t t empt to  gain credence i n  socialist  
so c i et y ,  so that  eventua l ly the  church cou l d  s e rve it  mor e  e ffect ive ly . 
The Hungarian Re formed bi shop Albe rt Berec zky p i oneered a similar 
ap pro ach in Ht.mgary . He led  the Reformed and Lutheran Churche s ,  after 
some b i t t er i nne r-church ba t t les , into a po sture of  o f f ic ial ly giving 
their support ,  usua l ly without c r i t i c a l  perspec t ive , t o  the pre sent 
social  s y s tem. That a t t i tude e arned t ho se church leaders who were 
deeme d re l i ab le by the government certain privi lege s . The se inc luded 
represent a t ion in t he p a r l iament , ana logous to  the one t hey had in 
pre-s o c ial i s t  t ime s , or c le rgy salarie s be ing pa id by the s t a t e . But the 
p r i ce has be en that this chu rch leader ship s e l f-censored exp re s s i ons of 
d i s s en t .  The on ly t ime whe n  e i ther int erna l oppo s i t ion to this  course o r  
popular re s en tment aga in st such p o l ic ies  sur faced w a s  during t he 1956 
Hungar ian Revo lt . At the t ime nearly a l l  the voca l  proponent s of 
" re lig i on for s o c i a l i sm" we re qu ick ly demo t e d  f rom t he i r  p o s i t ions , only 
to be reins t a t e d  shor t l y  after  the crushing of the revo l t . 
The re is a l so t he group of  younger c lergy , born s ince the 
es tab l i shment of social i sm ,  for whom socia l i sm is the only s o c ia l  system 
t hey have experienced .  For a number o f  them,  there is  no f e e l ing o f  
gui l t  o r  sent iment al  wi shing f o r  t h e  re turn of  the pa s t . Whi l e  they 
ac cept as normal t he l i fe of  t he church under socia l i sm t hey a l s o  tend 
to be crit ical , not so much of  the syst em per se , but of  the 
shortcomings in t he imp lementat i on of s o c i a l i s t  idea l s . They a re more 
likely to feel more secure in que s t i oning day to day po l ic ie s . Usually 
t hey l ack the ze al  or ide a l i s t ic enthusiasm of  their o lder c o l l eagues 
and yet they do not even cont emp l a t e  what it wou l d  be l ike if  socialism 
we re not t he sy s t em in their c ount ry . Many o f  t hem t hink t hat soc ial ism 
ha s ma de some advanc e s  which should not be given up . If they opp o s e  on a 
part icular i s sue it u s ual ly does not me an that t hey oppose soc i a l i sm ;  
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ra the r they tend to  oppo se a spec i f i c  pervers i on or ma lpract ice of 
soc ia l i sm.  One c an s ee such an a t t i t ude among t he many youthful 
Chr i s tians who we re invo lved in the upheava l s  in Hungary , 
Czecho s lovakia , and Poland . 
It may come as a surp r i s e  t o  many that there i s  one mor e  mode l , on 
this sc ale , which we c an l oo s e ly tag as " so c i a l i s t  r e l igi on . "  That 
shou ld be a contradict i on in t e rms , but it is no t .  Percept ive analys i s t s  
have no ted long ago that Marx ism may t u rn into a "p seudo-re l igion" for 
some of it s adherent s . Now even many Marxi s t s  recognize that one may 
have a "re ligious " a t t i tude toward soc ial i sm.  One Marxi s t  wrote of 
"black cleric a l i sm" be ing supp lant ed by "red c l erica l i sm" or " athe i s t  
cleric a l i sm . " 4 Whi le i n  mo s t  ins t anc e s  such "soc i a l i s t  rel igion" is 
eva luated negative ly by bo th Marx i s t s  and non-Marxist  t h inkers , it is 
qui t e  ev ident that soc i a l i sm can e l i c i t  a kind of  response on part of 
some of its  f o l lowe rs wh ich usua l ly char acterizes  religious movement s , 
though , in the op in ion of  many , it i s  i do la t rous re l igion . The r e fore , 
one must use this category very care fu l ly and in a nuanced way . It 
shou ld be granted , however , that there is  such a phenomenon as 
" so c i a l i s t  re ligion" and note , as mo st analysts  do , that it  is most 
deve l o pe d  among the socia l i s t  bureaucracy ( apartachiks ) . I f  this is 
correct , then relig i on indeed cont inues to have a mo s t  p ro found social 
impact under soc ial i sm (e . g .  in the form of  Stal inism , Mao i sm ,  or any 
other "c ult of pe rsonal ity" ) . 
Not a l l  churche s can ea s i ly be c a t egori zed into this t yp o l ogy . The 
Roman Ca t ho l ic Church in Poland , which undoub tedly has the great e s t  
s o c i a l  impact of  a l l  Ea s t  European Churche s ,  may b e  perce ived by 
different people to f i t  different ca tegories . Many have s een t he Roman 
Ca tho l ic Church a s  the s t aunche s t  soc i a l  opponent of the branch of the 
pro-Soviet soc ia l i sm which is  dominant in Poland . I t s  mora l  authority is 
derived from its unf l inching pro t ec t ion of  certain right s and i dea l s . 
Othe rs a t tribute success  to the Po l i sh Roman Catho l ic Church to i t s  
wis dom of  not p l aying a n  over t ly po l i t ical  ro l e  b u t  i t s  s t anding a t  a_ 
p ercep t i ve distance f rom the soc i a l i s t  s y s t em itse l f . At t he s ame t ime , 
the church pass ionat ely ident i f ie s  with Po l i sh nat ional interes t s .  
S ome t imes this p roduces p o l icies  in s upport of the govern ing pa rty and 
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some t ime s advocacy of oppo s it ion cau s e s . Fina l ly there are tho se  who may 
perceive t he Po l i sh Roman Ca tho l ic Church as hav ing come to te rms with 
life within soc i a l i sm and pursu ing a cour s e  of  c r i t ical accept ance , 
embrac ing cer t a in fea tur es o f  t he new s o c i a l  real ity but la sh ing out at 
ot her s .  
Current l y  the f ir s t  three mode l s  are the mo s t  widely ut i l i zed , 
though i t  wou ld not be w i se to  a t t empt to quan t i fy this  gene r a l i zat ion 
beyond an e duca ted e s t imat e  that perhap s the large s t  numbe r  of  rel igiou s 
p eo p le vaguely op ted for t he sec ond model of " re l ig ion ind i f fe rent to  
so c i a l i sm , "  for i t  i s  the one lea s t  demanding and , under condit i ons o f  
bureaucr a t ic t o t a l i t arian i sm , the one mo s t  favored by the s t ructure of  
th e sys t em .  In the e s t imat i on of  this  author the mo s t  creat ive opt i on i s  
" re l ig i on w i thin soc ial i sm" wh ich is based o n  the pre suppo s i t ion that 
re l igion can ope rate under a var i e t y  of social  sys t ems and that it can 
not me re ly adap t  i t s e l f  to it but engage c r i t ical ly in t he p roce s s  of 
soc i a l  tr ans forma t i o n , dep ending on concre te  p o l i t ical c i rcums t ance s .  
This view holds that no g iven soc ial  sys t em i s  inherent ly "Chr i s t ian" 
but that the more ba s ic i s sue is how any social  sys tem i s  made to serve 
bas ic human needs , inc l uding spi ri tual ones . The opt i on "re ligion for 
socia l i sm" l ikewi s e  ha s produced some though t ful ( a s  we l l  a s  some naive 
or s in i s t e r )  theo log ical  re f l ect ions which va lue t ho se  features of  
s o c ia l i sm mo s t  in accord with the grea t  humane re l igious s t rivings and 
p romot es  th e i r  imp leme n t a t i on ins t ead of sys t ems of inj us t ice . 
If one were to  ask wh ich of  the s e  mode l s  i s  mo s t  e f fect ively 
inf luenc ing soc ial p o l i c ies , no clear answer c an be g iven . I t  i s  not s o  
much the model  i t s e l f  which det e rmines t h e  inf l uence but a who le ne twork 
of h i s t o r ical , n a t i onal , po l it ical  ( foreign and dome s t ic ) ,  economic , and 
other re asons . A church ' s  int rans igent opp o s i t i on to  soc i a l i sm may 
e i ther relegate it into obscurity or ca t ap u l t  i t  into t he focus of  
oppo s it i on ,  depending on fac t o r s  such a s  the power o f  the party , the 
suc c e s s  or f a i lure of economic p o l i c i e s , int erna t ional r e l a t ions , 
na t i o nal ident i f icat i o n , etc . Sho u l d  for ins t ance the Yugo slav 
fe dera t ion get into po l i t ic a l  j eopardy and Cro a t ian separat i sm become a 
mo re po t ent movement , the Roman Catho l ic Church may be perceived as 
p ro t ect or of the C roa t i an nat ional va lues and w i l l  i ncrease i t s  
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inf luence . On the ot her hand should  the federat ion succeed and the 
Ca tho l ic Church be un ab le to adjust i t s e lf to this real ity it  may. be 
re legated to the ro le of  a minor nu i s ance on such i s sues as abo r t ion 
laws . Much depends on a church ' s  p ercep t ive judgment not only of t he 
po l i t i cal moods of the country but a l s o  the sense of  wha t  is  more 
ultimately right or wrong for t he people it rep resents and for those it 
doe s no t rep re sent but care s for . 
I a l so venture t o  expre s s  the judgment that the only opt i on doome d 
not to have l ong range soc ial e f f e c t s  is a non-critical support 
at t itude . Whi l e  in the sho r t  run thi s p o l icy may yie l d  some pract ical 
resul t s , in , for ins tance , be ing ab le to  int ervene on beha lf  of 
indivi dua ls  impri soned or per secut e d  or in s o f tening the impact o f  this  
. or  th at decre e ,  in  t he l ong run a pos i t i on wh ich is  me rely convey ing t he 
views of the po l i cy-makers is  ne i t her re spect e d  by the promoters 
( because one did n ot comp l e t e ly jo in them) nor by t he c r i t ics or  
di s s enters or even the pa s s ive part o f  the( populat ion,  because they 
perce ive t he group as be ing compromi sed ,  as being "bought o f f "  or be ing 
dupe d .  In any case a Chr i s t ian who can say "ye s "  to a soc i e t y  c an 
meaningfu l ly do so only if she or he c an a l so say "no " .  Mere "yes" 
saying doe s  not make dist inct ions be tween God and Cae sar . Potent ia l ly 
and real ly that is t he core of t he i s sue of the social impact of 
Chris tians in a society which tends t o  requ i re ab s o lute a l l egiance to  
Caes ar . The very fact  that Chr i s t ians ( and other re ligi oni s t s )  do not 
share thi s  al legiance makes re l igion b o th potent ia l ly and rea l ly an 
autonomous s ource of social inf luence . 
Areas o f  Grea t e s t  Impact 
Now one may ask in wha t  fie lds , or in wha t  areas doe s re l igion tend 
to  show t he gre a t e s t  and mo st  cons tant impact on pub l ic pol icy? 
In Eastern Europe , in addit ion to the t r adit iona l impact on ethnic 
or nati onal p ol i c ies , one may say that a conce rn for the imp lementation 
of  ethical  or rel igio-ethical va lues has the greate s t  impact and is 
apprec iated even by tho se rare ly wil l ing to pra i se religion . 
When one considers the que s t ion o f  the re la tive power o f  Marxist  
ideo logy , or re ligi on , or na t iona l i sm ,  it  i s  important to  observe that 
of  the three na t iona l i sm is  the mo s t  p o tent force . Whi le some peop le 
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are ready to live and die for the Communi s t  idedo logy , this  cannot be 
s a id of the major it y .  Many people undoub t e d ly shou ld be wi l l ing t o  make 
the sup reme sacri f ice of l i f e  or death in the name o f  the i r  re l igion , 
but they a re not in t he major ity e i ther . Nat iona l i sm ( and in the 
mu lt inationa l s t a t e s ,  ethnic i ty of  the component nat ional uni t s )  i s  
p robab ly t he mo st  p o te nt mot ivat or for t he l arge s t  number of  peop l e . The 
un ive r s a l  c l a ims of re l ig ion and the internat iona l i s t  c l a ims of  
Communi st  ideo logy both have had to make al lowances  for  the inf luence of  
na t i onal i sm .  The Communi s t s  have re a l i ze d  that  nat iona l Communi sm i s  a 
po t ent fac t or among so c i a l i st s tates  and p ar t ies . The churches have long 
been wi l l ing t o  ma intain a very c lo s e  r e l a t i onship with the nat ionality  
of th eir t e rr i t ory . Both church and s t a t e  mu st  come to c op e  w i th the 
impact of nat iona l i sm .  Both have of t en s ought to demon s t r a t e  the i r  own 
loyalty to it and , l ikewi se , a t t emp ted t o  c a s t  doub t s  in regard t o  the 
loy a l t y  to the nat i onal idea on the part of the ir a dver s ary . The 
gove rnment f inds it s e l f  o f t en at  odds w i th a church ' s  impact and 
at temp t s  to counteract  it , be ing , however , qui t e  aware o f  the potent 
e ffect that t he churches c an have in vol a t i le na t iona l i s t ic conf lict 
s i tuat ion . The po l ic i e s  of  a church can e i ther acce l era t e  or  diminish 
t he nat ional  enmity . The govenment i s  usual ly quite aware of  the power 
of th e church in this  ar ea and takes it in t o  account in i t s  l egi s la t ive 
and admini strat ive p o l i c ies . 
Ano ther area of  the impact of  re l igion i s  in the realm o f  social  
and indivi dual e thical ma t t e rs . Wh i l e  this  i s  an area in which churche s 
have exer t e d  cus t omary inf l uence over the cent urie s ,  in soc i a l i s t  
s o c ie t ies  of E a s t e rn Europe the ethical impact of t h e  churches h a s  been 
he ightene d . Two fac t o r s  coalesced  to bring this  about . One is that rap i d  
indus t r i a l i z a t i on and urbani zat ion brought about a ne arly total 
breakdown of  the tradi t i onal interp e r s ona l and socia l l inks which 
re inforced t he norms and mores  of  the prior e ra . Th i s  l e f t  many peopie 
adri f t . On the other hand , Marxism has no t paid  a grea t  deal of  
a t te nt i on to t he deve l opment of e thical  norms and inculcat ing them into 
the popul a t ion desp i t e  frequent appea l s  t o  soc i a l i s t  mora l i ty . In fact 
t he pre dom inant prac t ic a l  approach to e th ics among Commun i s t s  was a 
pragma t ic approach th at  tended to relat ivize a l l  norms subject on ly to 
- 13 -
the ult ima t e  goa l o f  their victory . 
With large segment s of the pop u la t i on set adr i f t  and wit hout 
constrain t s , many in s t ituti ons suffere d ,  i nc l uding the fami ly , economic 
enterp r i ses , and the government it sel f . Low working morale , sabot age , 
lazine s s ,  thef t ,  b r ib e s , nep o t i sm ,  lack of  personal integrity and c ivil 
courage were among the re sult s ,  which harmed produc t ivity and the l iving 
st andar d .  Marxist  leade rs not i ced that re ligiou s ly mot iva ted p eople 
of ten re sisted such temptat ions more e f fec t ive ly than other s . They 
wel'comed the church ' s  appeals to its  members to s t ick to the ethical 
norms , since the government wou ld pro f i t  f rom it . Thus , for ins t anc e , 
the .gove rnment welcomed t he endorsement of the Hungar i an Prote s t ant 
Churches of it s agr icultural p o l i c i e s  of co l lect ivi zat ion . Peas ant s were 
urged to coopera te for t he nat ional we lfare . The Roman Ca tho l ic Bi shop s 
and c l ergy frequently appealed to a h igher work ethic among Pol ish 
worke r s ,  being, howeve r ,  care ful to b a lance it with c r i t ic i sm of  
bureauc ratic misdoings . Thi s  i s  one o f  the reasons  why that  Church 
became so succe s s ful as a me diator b et we en the gove rnment and the 
Solidar ity labor un ion . In Eas t Germany the Pro t e s t ant Churche s  appea l e d  
t o  young people and o the rs to g o  to t h e  farms and he lp f arme rs w i t h  the 
harve s t  when the government reque s t e d  such vo luntary labor . But the 
government rejected the use of  Chr i s t i an labor brigades who set out t o  
work in the f i e l d s  and ce l ebrated a shared communa l mea l  int erpre ted by 
pa rticipants  as Ho ly Commun i on .  
S ome t ime s the churche s '  ethic a l  teach ings re f lect only the 
t radi t i onal way of do ing things and can be seen as an obs tacle by the 
st ate in making ne eded soc ial  change s .  Thus for ins t ance , certa in 
c u l tural mores and super s t it ious pract ices wh ich were a s sociated with 
re l igion cont inue to be advocated by cert ain church members  or leaders . 
The se may be " f a i th heal ing" in preference to me dical a t t ention , 
av oidance of certain foods or rejec t i on of  publ ic educat ion . In an 
athe i s t ic state whe re t he p ropaganda a t t emp t s  t o  port ray the conflict  a s  
a conf l ict between sc ience and re l igion , it  may b e  to the advantage o f  
t he gove rnment t o  c aric ature a l l  religion as as s o c ia t ed with 
tradi t i onal supers t i t ious fo lkways and va lue s . 
S ome times t he religio-e thical values of  a church are in oppo s i t ion 
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to  the in tended po l ic ie s  of  the government .  Thi s  has been the case  with 
t he Roman Ca thol ic Church concern ing divorce laws , abor t i on , and b irth 
cont r o l  laws , no t un l ike conf l ic t s  in the We s t .  The government maintains 
that this is a mixing of  t he church into p o l i t ical  i s sues cont rary to 
the principle  of  separat i on of  church and s t a t e ;  the churche s maintain 
that it is t he pro te c t i on of human righ t s . One needs to mention 
pa ren thet i c a l ly that Marxi s t  convict ions are o f t en t o t a l l y  pragmat ic . 
For instance , in Hungary a l iberal abo r t i on law was passed  only to  be 
qu ickly rescinded when the b i rt hrate was deemed insuf f i c ient . 
While  some of  t he re ligious impact in t he sphere of e thics occurs 
in conf l ic t  with Marxi s t  no t ions , this  is  no t a l way s the c a s e . There i s  
room f or dia logue and mutual inf luence o r  comp l ementarity . Marxi sm has a 
more deve loped theory of  work and it s creat ive place in human 
deve l opment . On t he o ther hand re ligion has t ended to promo te a 
re sponsib l e  a t t i tude toward work.  In Po land , for ins t ance , Chr i s t ians 
and Marxis t s  engage d in dia logue on t he nature and dignity of  work . 
Dia l ogue on ethic a l  is sue s is  only in it s incept ion , but if  it  were t o  
be pursue d  i t  cou ld prove bene f i c i a l  to  both part ies . 
Ano the r area for coop erat ion is  the s t ruggle for peace and 
disarmament . Wi thout judg ing t he genuineness  of t he Commun i s t  de s i re for 
peace , the proc l a ime d p o l i cy of  the Commun ist  government s is peace with 
jus t i ce ( on their terms , of c ourse ) .  The c oun t r ies  of  Eastern Europe 
have been fre quent ly invo lve d in deva s t a t ing wars cu lminat ing in Wor l d  
War II . t he p op u l a t i on genu ine ly des ires peace . The re f ore it  is  n o t  hard 
for the Churche s to  reca l l  that it is  their t a sk to  s t rive for peace and 
jus t ice . It is irre levant at this p o int whet her t he Communi s t  
government s may b e  us i ng their churche s f o r  certain propaganda purpo s e s . 
The point is that at lea s t  ext erna lly t he goals  seem to  be para l le l . 
Whi l e the churches  rarely had the freedom t o  t ake an e xp l ic it ly c r i t ical  
a t t i t ude towar d their own gove rnment ' s  p o l i c ies , at least  in  some 
ins t ances the church app e a l s  are direct e d  t oward a l l  government s to end 
t he arms ra ce and in part icu lar to b an nuc lear weapons . S ince 
cons crip t i on is  un ive r s a l  in East ern European count r i e s  the Churche s 
have s hown no endors ement of  pac i f ism,  as t hey has t en to  po int out , and 
have no t been vo ic ing a defense of conscientious objec t i on . The only 
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except ion to that is  in East Germany , whe re some young Chr i s t ians have 
vo iced their obje c t ions to performing mi l i t ary dut ies . S ome l ocal 
churche s and some church lea ders have caut i ou s l y  defended their young 
members . The fact that this di sturbs t he gove rnment probab ly is a 
gre ater test imony t o  the abnorma l fear o f  the Commun i s t government of 
any di ssent than to t he actual power of  t he church to a l t er s t ate 
po l i cie s .  
I f  be ing a humane per s on or a humane society is o f  va lue t o  the 
churches then t he mo st encompa s s ing inf luence that the churches could 
have would be to bring a "human face " to socia l i sm ,  as the Czechos l ovaks 
c oined t he phra se in 1 9 68 . Whether that is actua l ly pos s ib l e  remains yet 
to be seen ; previ ous f a i lure s do not prec lude that po s s ib i l it y  for a l l  
e te rnity.  An analy s i s  s t i l l  needs t o  b e  made whe ther cont emporary fo rms 
of socia l i sm are capable of  becoming the kind of liberating socie t ies 
wh ich Marx dr eamed about , but certain ly s ome improvements are po s s ib l e .  
I n  few inst ance s  churche s have consc i ou s l y  worke d in that dire c t ion . 
In soc ie t ies in which the gove rnment ove r s t re s s es un ity and 
st rives  to have comp l e t e  consensus on a l l  i s sue s , at t empt ing to deny 
p lural ism ,  the churches  have p revented full  a s s im i l a t i on a�d uniformity . 
In the pa st  it was eas ie r  for religions t o  ident i fy themse lves with 
social forms ; but s ince Commun i sm f o s t e rs an athe i s t  soc iety such 
syncre t i sm is very hard .  This  guarantees at lea s t  s ome degree of 
dive r s ity and diff erences  of app roach in a given country and is  a very 
di s t inct factor in the minds of the p o l icy-makers , who e xper i ence this 
as a hur dle for their p lans of  uni formity . 
The inf luence of  a new kind o f  spir itual ism ha s been no ted among 
t he in t e l lectua l s  and t he young in some p laces in Eastern Europ e , 
no tab ly in the Sovie t Uni on as described by Alexsander S o l zhenit s yn and 
Mihaj lo Mihaj l ov .  I t s  impact is not yet mea surab le in the e s t imate of 
thi s  author .  It is a more latent than act ive impac t .  Another latent 
impact is that of t he popular religious leaders , such as s t ar t s i  
( asce tic , mona s t i c  o l d  men living in seclusion but revered f o r  their 
holiness by the ma s s es ) and certain b i shops , who might , in case o f  a 
cr i s i s ,  provide su itable lea der ship for d i s s enters . The populat ion of ten 




es pecial ly true in rura l area s . In Romania , for ins tance , the bishops of  
t he Orthodox Chu rch may have an entire vil lage , inc luding t he Communist 
of ficia l s , go out spontaneously to gre e t  them upon arriva l ;  such a 
wel come may not be acc orded to gove rnment o f ficia ls  even with 
considerab le prio r  prepa ration . The S l avic t e rm "vladika " ,  meaning 
r u le r ,  is s till  conven tiona l ly applied to  many Orthodox bishops . A 
simi l ar re spect  is en j oy e d  by Roman Cat ho lic hie rarchs . In Hungary some 
of t he higher c l e rgy a re s till  members of Par liament . While this doe s 
no t mean that they have out right po litic a l  power , it doe s se rve as a 
sign of recognition in their societ y .  They a re accorded V . I . P .  s t atus  at 
receptions and airpor t s ,  and in the me dia . 
In two of  the Eas t e rn European coun t rie s the re ligious pre s s  
\ 
plays a cer t ain independent and inf luential role . In Po land this pre ss 
was partic ularly vigorous and has neve r been t o t a l l y curtaile d .  they 
pub li sh journa ls , maga zin e s  and even weekly new spapers , ( e . g. Wie z  and 
Tygodnik Powzs echny ) . During liberal  periods  such a pre s s  become s  
pa r tic u lar ly a c tive in providing a l te rna te int erpre t ations . In 
Yugo s lavia the re ligious pre s s  was nea r ly e liminat e d  a f t e r  the 
Communi$t take-ove r ,  b ut was revived in t he 1 960s . Current ly it is so 
independent that it criticizes the government , some time s in vei l e d  and 
some times in open ways . In re spon se certain pub lic a tions are 
occa siona l ly banne d .  The re ligious pre s s  was a l s o  vigorous in 
C z echo s lovakia during t he "Prague Spring" but is now so tight ly 
cont ro l le d  that it is innocuous . The Hungarian ,  Romanian , and East 
Ge rman re ligious publica tions seem to  have no po litical  inf luence . The 
other coun trie s have either a very limited religious pre s s  or none at 
a l l . 
Two count rie s have po litic al  par tie s or organizations with 
po litic al repres ent a tion in t he par liament . In East  Ge rmany t he 
Chris tian Democra tic Union is guarant eed a fixed number o f  sea t s  in 
t he legi s latu re . Right a f t er t he war it conceived of  it s e l f  as 
po t entia l ly independent but soon therea f t e r  defined it s e l f  as a 
vehic le of implement a tion of t he " s cientific " views of t he ruling 
S ocia list  Unity Par ty (Marxis t ) .  Curren t l y  it is not providing any 
al t e rna te optio ns . Howeve r ,  l ea ding pe rsona lities of this pa rty often 
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oc cupy import ant o f fices  e . g .  supreme court jus t ice , p r e s ident o f  the 
par l i ament , e tc . In Po l and several Roman Ca t ho l ic lay organi z a t i ons , 
name ly "Znak" , "Pax" and the "Chr i s tian Soc ial Assoc iat ion" have a 
J .. ·signa ted numb er of their l eaders ( not  more than 5 each ) in t he Seym .  
In some ins tances  these deput i e s  have ab s t ained from vot ing for 
gove rnment p o l ic i es . A few even vo ted against t he government , which 
cau s e d  much agitat ion and some t ime s rep lacement of the "errant" 
deput ies . No such po l i t ic a l  group ings exi s t  in other E a s t e rn European 
coun t rie s . 
Scho o l s  are another poten t i a l  inf l uence in soc i e t y . For that 
r eas on a sharp separ a t i on of scho o l s  f rom t he church was a dvocated by 
the Coill!l)uni s t s  and carried out in Eastern Europe . Near ly all church 
schoo ls · became pub l ic .  The excep t i on ,  aga in , is P o l and where the 
Catho l ic Unive rs i t y  in Lub l in is the only such private ins t it u t i on in 
Ea s t e rn Eu rope . The re a re two o ther academies which l ikewi se  t rain 
studen t s  no t intending to  be ordained a s  clergy . In other count ries  
t he schoo ls  a re mo s t ly t heo logical s eminaries  or p repara t ory religious 
schoo l s , though in Hungary a few high schoo l s  were l e f t  in church 
h ands . 
I t  is common knowle dge that there wer e  no independent labor 
unions in Eastern Europe unt i l  t he cre a t i on of "So l idarity" in P o land 
in 1980.  The impact o f  the Roman Catho l ic Church on this independent 
uni on movement is f a i r ly w e l l  known . He re t he labor uni on l eaders 
inc l uded among their demands , the demand for more re l igious liberty 
and for t he use of ma s s  me dia for commun ic a t ing religious ceremonies 
and se rmons . Prayers and prie s t ly counse l ,  inc luding consu l t a t ion with 
t he highe st clergy , inc l uding t he b i shop primate of  Poland , was 
fre quent . "Sol idar i t y "  was the large s t  ma s s  movemen t  in Poland ' s  
h i s t ory and t he Roman Ca tho l ic Church p layed a very central role  in 
that movement . One can regard th i s  as the h igh wat e rmark o f  
po l i t ic al and social inf luence of a church in Eastern Europe under a 
Communi s t  regime . 
S ource of  t he Churche s ' Inf luence 
The churche s are s t i l l  the s ingle l a rge s t  ma s s  o rganizat ion in 
e ach Eas tern Eur ope an c ountry and this undoubtedly contributed t o  
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their impact ,  a l though t he Communist  Party has worked out a f a i r ly 
e f f ec t i ve dominat ion of  socie t y  a s  a minor i t y  movement . 
S i ze is enhanced by t he percep t i on that t he r e l igious 
in s t i tu t i ons are among the ve ry few ins t i t ut i ons  permi t t ed to funct ion 
in a communist  soc iety . Thus , as noted above , churches some t ime s draw 
the support of di s s ent ers  and o t he r  d i s s a t i s f i e d  people . When at an 
East er Midnight l iturgy in Tb i l i s i , Georgia , ( USSR ) , t he church is 
crowded with young ma l e s  between 15 and 30 , that is proba b ly l e s s  an 
expre s s i on of relig io us fervor and more a Georg ian nationa l i s t ic 
demon s trat ion agains t cent r a l  government p o l icie s of Rus s if i cat ion . If 
at t he grave-s i te of Alojz ije Cardinal S t ep inac in Zagreb thous and s of 
peop le place f l owers or candle s ,  they are no t merely coming t o  pay 
re spect to a dea d p re l a t e  but are making a s t atement about Croat ian 
na t i ona l'i sm and de fying the government which a t t empt e d  to crush 
S t ep inac . The crosses  made of f lowe rs  in War saw in August of  1 98 2  are 
obv i ou s l y  mor e  a symb o l  of  re s i s tance to  the mi l it ary rule than they 
a re pure ly re ligi ous symbo ls . The s ign i f icant fact is t hat these 
re s i stance s are taking on d i s t inct rel igious symbo l i sm .  
Ano ther reason for t he impact o f  re ligion i s  t he power of 
tradi t i on in a wor l d  that shows l it t l e apprec iat ion for tradi t i ons . 
R e l igi on appea rs to be one of the few s t ab l e  e l ements  in a rap idly 
changing wor l d .  Many are yearning for s t ab i l it y  and secur ity and are 
hop ing to f ind it in in s t itut ions wh ich have t ended to show s t ab i l ity 
and sought to conserve va lue . 
The churche s have a l so t ended to  he lp individua l s  in t ime o f  need 
and ha ve p l aced some emphas i s  on p e r s onal s a lva t ion .  Th is  is 
part icularly t rue of Pro t e s t ant s .  The bureauc ra t ic t o t a l i t arianism 
which emerged in E a s t e rn Europe as a r e sult  of  the int eract i on of 
Marx i s t  ideo l ogy and mo dern indus t r i a l i zat ion , urb an i zat ion , and 
sec u l ar i z a t i on seems to show very l i t t l e  interest  in t he individual 
and the individua l ' s problems . Where sha l l  a per son go when haun t e d  by 
f ea r ,  doub t , anxiet y ,  lone l ine s s , rejec t ion , l o s s  of dignity and 
re spec t ?  Or whe re sha l l  a per son celebrate the fest ive e l ement s of 
l if e ,  such as b irt h ,  pube rty ,  marr iage , and death? To whom sha l l  one 
un load a troub l e d  consc ience ? S ecular society  has not provide d  enough 
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avenues for p e rs ona l concerns and the churche s have continued t o  
fu lfi ll an important function .  
Many people fee l the need for change or trans format ion , a s  they 
are not happy with thems leves as t hey a re . Perhaps they are adrift  or 
unfu l fi l le d .  Unl ike the Wes t ,  society does not provide for such needs 
because ps ycho logy and ana lys is are not gene ral ly ava i l ab l e . Many 
peop le have experienc e d  the grea t  trans forma t ional power of God in 
some a sp ect of church l ife  to such a degree that t hey cons ider it the 
central expe rience or experiences  of  their l ive s . The re sult  is  that 
they p lace sup reme or abso lute a l leg iance in what is for them the 
ult imate source of al l goo d . To them o t her goa l s , such as c l a s s  
s trugg l e , v ict ory of the proletar iat , l eader sh ip of the Commun i s t  
Party , t h e  great future socie t y , or anything e l s e  that may b e  he l d  up 
of sup reme va lue , alway s  come under God ' s u l t imate rul e .  Re lig ious 
peop le have mo s t  effect ive ly refused t o  rai s e  the l e s s er va lues of 
l ife to t he leve l  of u l t imacy . The ir f a i th in God helps them to j udge 
the s e  lesser  c l a ims and keep their demands in a dif ferent per spect ive . 
This appears to be t he very core of re l ig i on ' s  inf luence . From the 
government ' s  perspec t ive thi s  is  a grave threat becau s e  i t  seems to 
less en loyalty on t he part of a cons iderab le number of their c i t izens . 
Churche s have consequent ly been accused o f  unpatrio t ic , t r a i t orous 
behavior . Th is was t he exp l ic it charge in a number of show t r i a l s  in 
the late 1 940s and early 1 950s . Roman Catho l ic and other churche s with 
a s trong foreign c onnect i on have been a ddit ional ly accused o f  
be t raying the s t a t e  to the Vat ican , or the U . S . A .  or  s ome other 
for eign power . 
The churches have norma l ly affirmed their loyalty t o  the s t a t e  
and thereby recognized t he gove rnment as legit imate . Neverthe l es s , 
they have ma inta ined that God ' s law ha s primacy over s t a t e  law when 
t he two a re in c onf l ict . S ince much of Eastern European l eg i s la t ion 
di sc riminates  again s t  re l i gion , prohibi t ing or re s t ri c t ing many 
t ra d i t i onal religious activit ies , many religious p eop le do indeed 
perceive a conf lict  be tween their duty to God and the ir duty t o  the 
s ta t e . Under gre at dure ss in t imes of intense crisis , such as dur ing 
1 95 6  in Hungary , 1968 in Czechos lovakia , and 1 980s in Po land , for some 
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re l i gious people the tens ion become s unbearable and they turn against 
t he gove rnment , active ly or pass ive ly. Thus  religion may direct ly turn 
aga ins t the state , which it  i s  unl ike ly t o  do in more s t able  t ime s. 
Imp l icat ions for U.S. Pol icy 
From the above it  i s  obvious that it i s  dangerous t o  general ize 
about t he inf luence of t he churches upon s o c ial  p o l i c i e s  of the Soviet 
Uni on and Eastern Europe. One sho u l d  ne i t her ove remphas ize nor under­
r a te their inf luence. The role of the Catho l ic Church in Poland is not 
an ac curat e  mea sure of the secular role  of o t her churche s. But , on the 
other hand , n e ither is the Rus s i an Orthodox experience the best 
cr i t e rion. The impact va rie s from country t o  country and f rom church 
to church. For p o l  icy dec i s i ons one must be knowl edgab l e  about the 
concre te s i t uat ion. 
Nor is one to give unqua l i f i e d  support for the a ims of every 
church with the j us t i f ic at i on that anything that t ends to b reak the 
monop o ly of the Communi s t  Party is to the advantage of the U . S. or 
t he We st. The re a re some religi ous groups who se a ims may be even less 
1 in accord with one ' s  own perce ived intere s t  then that o f  the Communi s t  
Pa rty. If some of these groups we re t o  have their intent ions 
imp l emented grave in stab i l ity wou l d  re sult  not only in that region , 
but e l sewhe re as we l l. On the o ther h and t he correct path i s  t o  defend 
the re l i g ious liber t ie s as a fundament a l  human r i ght for every group , 
even tho se with who se aims one may not be ab le t o  agree. In that 
re spect one sho u l d  vo ice supp ort for their r i ght s ,  b ut not nece s sari ly 
for th eir a ims. 
One should not l o s e  s i ght  of the l i nks be tween nat ional i sm and 
r e l i g i on. As was po inted out above , nat ional i sm i s  s ome t ime s a more 
powerful mot ivator in Eastern Europe than e i t her re l i gion or i deology. 
But wh en ideo logy , for po l i t ic a l  reasons , sup r e s s e s  nationa l i sm ,  a 
church may appe ar to be the only channel  through wh ich nat iona l i sm can 
expre s s  i t s elf. S ome of  t he churche s have e i ther ins t inc t ive ly or 
de l ib e rately recognized t h i s  and made u s e  of it  for their own benef it. 
Th is i s , aft er a l l , not  a new t rend , but a centuries  o l d  t ra d i t i on ,  
where a church wa s t he de fender o f  na t i onal interes t s  i n  t ime of 
c r i s is. A nuance d  and caut i ous app ro ach shou ld be made le st  one 
encourage the r i s e  of  na t iona l i sm in order to weaken Communi s t  
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ideo logy . The Communi s t s  themse lve s t ended t o  undere s t ima te the p ower 
of nat i ona l i sm only t o  di scover that nat i onal commun i s tic i deo logies  
brought about Commun i s t  po lycentrism,  leading to several breakaways 
and severa l unsucces s ful attempt s at  breakaway from Soviet dominat ion . 
Soviet dominat i on and at t emp ts  at Rus s i ficat ion have emb i ttered not 
on ly the other Eastern European soc i a l i s t  nat i ons but a l s o  the 
non-Rus s ian na t iona l i t ies  in the Soviet Uni on . The churches have 
some t imes bene f i t e d  from the se  na t iona l i s t ic st riving s . But 
nat iona l i sm is a very dangerous a l ly ;  it c an result  in murderous and 
des truc t ive tendenc i e s  which can be encouraged only at everyone ' s  
per i l . If human l ife is important then U . S .  p o l icy wi l l  not be one 6f 
indi scriminate ly encouraging loc a l  nat iona l i sm .  
The U . S .  shou ld n o t  use t he churches  of  E a s tern Europe for narrow 
po l i t ical aims . The churches are a t t empt ing to work out their iden t i t y  
and mission under ext reme ly h ard c i rcums t a nces . One way i n  which t hey 
were hampered by the ir own government wa s by being accused o f  b e ing in 
an al l iance with "Americ an imper i a l i sm . " There is , indeed , a broad 
sympathy among church people in Eastern Europe , a s  among much of the 
gener al pop ula t ion , for t he We st  and for the U . S .  in particular . Thi s  
i s  the type of  goodwi l l  rarely found even among U . S .  a l l ie s , and i t  
must  not light ly b e  gamb led away by c rude exp lo itat ion . The wor s t  
po s s ib l e  re sult  would b e  that the government accusations woul d  b e  
j us t i f ied and the churches wou ld suffer even greater curtai lment o f  
the ir rights  than they do pre s ent ly . 
The goodwi l l  of church peop le i s  of  immea surab ly gre ater worth t o  
t he U . S .  than any short-range po l i t ical  advantage that cou ld b e  gained 
from manipulat ing a church . The be s t  p o l icy woul d  appear to be the 
same as t he one used dome s tical ly , name ly t he separation of  church and 
s t at e ;  as in the U . S . A .  the U . S .  government can be friendly to the 
churches  but keep a s t rict l ine of  demarcation . The U . S .  c an show 
support of the churche s , espec ia l ly tho s e  particularly badly treate d ,  
by in t ervening in their beha lf  ( e . g . t he support o f  Soviet Jews or  
Penteco sta l s , for  whom even highe s t  s t a t e  o f f ic i a l s  o f  the U . S .  
gove rnment in tervened with the Commun i s t  gove rnment officials ) .  But i f  
th i s  is no t done j udicious ly one may achieve the opp o s it e  e f f ect , 
name ly ge t t ing them into greater troub le and persecut i on than 
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he ret ofore , when they are exp l ic i t ly perceived as dome s t ic enemie s .  
Chris t ians in t he Soviet Uni on and Eastern Europe do have an 
a l t e rnate wor l d  view from the Commun i s t s . But one should no t conclude 
that this means that a l l  Chr i s t ians a re against their social  or 
government a l  system . Some Chr i s t ians are ve ry enthus i a s t ic in their 
sup port of  their gove rnment and of  t he soc ial i st system .  Others are 
me rely na tiona l i st i c ; in a time of  cri s i s  many wou l d  defend their 
country out  of  p a t ri o t i sm though t hey have l it t l e  love for i t s  soc ial 
system .  And undoubtedly there are a l s o  tho s e  who feel t o t a l ly trapped 
in their present s it uat i on and wou l d  do almo st anything to get away , 
inc luding emigrat i on or s i ding with rebe l forc e s  or an out s ide force 
in c a se of war .  S ome of the se people may be exp l ic ity pro-U . S . A . , 
ot he rs are not nec e s sari ly so . The ir r i ght to emigrate shou ld be 
s upp orted as a p r inc i p l e . S hould some a t t emp t to use criminal means , 
e . g .  hi j ack a p lane , they should not be dea l t  with more l enient ly.by 
We s te rn c ountries  than simi lar lawbreake rs at home . A safe guid e l ine 
to fo l l ow woul d  be the impl ementa t i o n  of the U . N .  Univer sal  
Dec larat i on of  Human R i gh t s  and the He l s inki Acc ord . 
Fina l ly U . S .  churche s shou ld be a l l owe d to  engage in lively 
contact wi th Ea ste rn European churches . The pract ice of  denying U . S .  
vi s a s  to tho s e  church leaders in Eas t e rn Europe who are support ive of 
their g ove rnment is  an abhorent prac t i ce wh ich gains few f r i ends for 
the gove rnment 1 s act i on e i t her at home or abro a d .  It only makes it 
l ook as if the U . S .  g ove rnment is  no b e t t er in that re spect than the 
Commun i s t  government s .  One is  not to  suppos e  that U . S .  church leaders 
a re un ab le to dis criminate between tho se who are obe dient ly t o e ing 
th eir government 1 s l ine and tho s e  who represent more genuinely their 
church mains tr eam . In order to  keep c ont acts one must meet both those 
who are pro-government and tho s e  who are moderat e ;  that may lead to 
lat er c ont acts with t he di s senters as we l l .  When detente p reva i l s  and 
when contac t s  are not imper i l le d ,  there i s  more room for e xerc i s ing 
relig ious and other f reedom . When pres sure is app l ie d  on t he S oviet 
Uni on and o t her Eas t e rn European government s e ither in genera l or 
exp l ic i t ly in sup p ort of  t he churches , a boomerang e ff ect s e t s  in and. 
the churche s find thems e lves more re s trict e d .  I t  i s  not surpris ing 
that t he church members and l eaders of Eastern Europe almost 
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unanimous ly favor detent e ;  t hey de fini t e ly p r o f i t  from it . On the 
other hand it is a l s o obvi ous that at  l e a s t  some of them apprec iate  a 
firm U . S. pos i t i on because they fear that if  t he U . S.S.R. has i t s  own 
way without resi stance the Commun i s t  s l ogan about the withering away 
of religion may u l t ima t e ly come in t ime . Thus a U.S. p o l icy which 
support s re l i g ious l iberties  at home and ab road is  one of  the 
bri ghte st rays of hope for the se who are anxiou s  about the future o f  
the churche s in their countries  and o n  a wor l dwide bas i s. 
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